On August
8, a coalition of rebel groups announced that they had
successfully broken the long-standing Syrian government siege
of rebel-controlled east Aleppo. Among the groups taking part in
the offensive was Jabhat Fath al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, al
Qaeda’s local affiliate in the country. Video footage released by the group showed
its contributions in key battles against regime positions around the
city.
Days
before the offensive to break the siege began, Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu
Muhammad al-Jolani appeared in an unprecedented video
message announcing that his group had cut formal ties with
al Qaeda and would henceforth operate under the name Jabhat Fath
al-Sham. Jolani said members would “strive toward unity with all
groups, in order to unify the ranks of the mujahideen and liberate
the land of [Syria] from the rule of [Bashar al-Assad] and his allies.”
Al Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri echoed Jolani’s message in a statement
acknowledging that the groups had parted ways. But whether the public
split reflected a true separation and cutting of organizational ties
remained unclear. U.S. officials have said they continue to consider Jabhat
Fath al-Sham a terrorist group, despite its new branding.
Following
the successful offensive in east Aleppo, it seems that Jabhat Fath al-Sham
has cemented its place in the Syrian uprising for the
foreseeable future. Its success on the battlefield has fed
speculation that it will try to unify rebel factions under a single
banner, in preparation for a push to wrest the entire city from government
control.
“So far,
nothing is definitive yet, but there are increasing talks of a merger, and
Jabhat Fath al-Sham has wanted to absorb the other factions under a new banner
for some time,” says Hassan Hassan, a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute
for Middle East Policy, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. “The previous
hurdle was the name of al Qaeda, which gave some people cold feet because they
didn’t want to be associated with that group. The vagueness of the
continued relationship between Jabhat Fath al-Sham and al Qaeda is what has dissuaded
some groups from associating with them more closely, although they still
cooperate against the regime on the ground.”
Jabhat Fath
al-Sham fighters advanced on a road as they seized key positions south of
Aleppo, Syria, on Aug. 6, 2016.
Photo:
Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images
Hassan says that a merger of the rebel groups could backfire,
potentially benefiting the Syrian regime and its allies. “Jabhat Fath
al-Sham are pushing to become the only armed group against Bashar
al-Assad,” he says. “Although the regime might suffer tactically as a result of
its enemies unifying, even potentially losing parts of Aleppo, they
could win the narrative if the opposition came together under Jabhat
Fath al-Sham’s banner.”
Such a
merger would also make it easier for U.S. officials to justify targeting other
Syrian opposition groups like Ahrar al-Sham, as it would more
closely associate them with a designated terrorist organization. Along
with the Syrian
government and mainstream opposition groups, Jabhat Fath
al-Sham has been accused by monitoring organizations of
committing systematic human rights abuses over the course of Syria’s civil war,
including kidnappings and extrajudicial executions.
Jabhat
Fath al-Sham is eager, however, to bolster its image.
Mostafa
Mahamed, also known as Abu Sulayman al-Muhair, is a 32-year-old Australian
citizen and director of foreign media relations for Jabhat Fath al-Sham. He is
wanted by Australian authorities and has been listed as a specially designated global
terrorist by U.S. officials. Born in Egypt and raised in the suburbs of Sydney,
Mahamed has been in Syria since 2012.
Mahamed
agreed to respond to a series of written questions from The Intercept about
Jabhat Fath al-Sham’s relations with other Syrian rebel factions, its
plans regarding the battle of Aleppo, and the nature of its current
relationship with al Qaeda. Given the far-reaching potential
implications of this merger, responses to the questions have
been included below, lightly edited, and condensed for clarity.
Why did
Jabhat al-Nusra break with al Qaeda, and what does this break mean in both
practical and ideological terms?
Before
talking about the split from al Qaeda and the formation of Jabhat Fath al-Sham,
I would like to make it absolutely clear that we believe that organizational
affiliations are usually temporary. Once the goal of that affiliation can no
longer be met, or a larger, more important goal cannot be achieved as a result
of that affiliation, then it is time to move on. At the time, Jabhat Al-Nusrah
had a relationship with al Qaeda. It served a purpose by funneling a global,
Islamic support of a jihad into the local Syrian arena. It was able to support
an already very popular jihad with the brand that many mujahideen identified
with. By doing this, Jabhat Al-Nusrah was able to focus the efforts of the
youth and channel their energies into an Islamic and justified, moral cause.
The need for that no longer exists, however. The break was also
required in order to fulfill our communal obligations to the
Muslims in Syria. The practical implications of the split include the full
independence we now enjoy, which gives us more freedom in decision-making. It
also removed potential obstacles that stand in the way of a long hoped-for
unification of ranks.
In short,
we did this for the people who may have been deceived by the claims that
strikes against Jabhat Al-Nusrah were due to its affiliation with al Qaeda.
It’s a response to the people, who were thankful for the split. In terms of the
ideological implications, it must be noted that there exists a common ideology
between all Muslims. This cannot be ignored. Differences that set organizations
or movements apart are usually methodological. People will differ in their
views regarding the correct method to bring about change, and we do recognize
the need to tolerate these differences and collaborate with all sincere parties
working in the right direction. Leaving al Qaeda gives people more room to draw
closer and allow for a freer, more comfortable environment for open discussion,
without being stigmatized.
Fighters
from Jabhat Fath al-Sham listen to a speech at an armament school after
they recaptured two military academies and a third military position south of
Aleppo, Syria, on Aug. 6, 2016.
Photo:
Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images
Many have claimed that this breaking of ties is intended to be purely
for cosmetic purposes — to detach JFS from the scrutiny al Qaeda normally
invites. What is your response to this?
It is
true that al Qaeda does invite scrutiny, much of which was created by false
media and government directives. However, our objective was certainly not
cosmetic. We genuinely believe it is time to move on from that period and
work toward a more pragmatic option that will allow accommodation of a wider
audience. Seeking ways to work with a now popular jihad and accommodate the
diversity within the Islamic movement is a priority for our organization. In
order for success to be achieved in Syria, different groups need to put aside
smaller differences and work toward the common goal that Muslims aspire to.
What is
JFS’s position with regard to its future relations with al Qaeda, as
well as its stance toward the United States and European powers?
After our
announcement of the establishment of Jabhat Fath al-Sham, there were those
waiting for some kind of “proof” that we have changed or reformed. That meant
to them that we needed to publicly condemn al Qaeda, their leaders, our past
and basically announce that we have retracted everything we have ever done. I
believe that is not only unfair, but it was also intended to create an obstacle
in our path. The very next day, people were quick to claim this was cosmetic,
like you mentioned. I believe that these people knew all too well our role in
Syria and that we are integral in bringing about change and a sustainable
stability, and that is not in their interest. When I say it is unfair to demand
proof of this “change” they are expecting, we have to remember that members of
any movement are diverse in the way they think. Movements are usually born in
extreme situations, and people join them because they identify with the general
concept at that given stage. It does not necessarily mean that all members of
any particular movement are in total agreement on all topics, and that is true
for al Qaeda just as it is true for all other movements in the world, Islamic
or other.
At the
end of the day, we will not be constrained by the definitions, policies, and
understandings of any foreign entity. We decide what our morals and values are
for ourselves based on our faith. We will not be a proxy of any satellite
state, nor will we give an opportunity for them to dictate to us what we should
or should not do. That is the whole point of our independence as Jabhat Fath
al-Sham. Relations with any nation, including the U.S. or Europe, are detailed
in Islamic political relations. Islam stresses the sanctity of contracts and
agreements. It also sees ceasefires and truces to be valid if the conditions
are met. However, we are far off from any kind of political relationship with
nations that not only watch while our people die, but insist to back the
tyrants who are killing, torturing, and displacing hundreds of thousands of
Muslims. Is there place in Islam for practical relations with Western states?
Yes, but only when they change their foreign policy and start to respect that
we will not dissolve into their system, nor will we be a client state.
What is
Jabhat Fath al-Sham’s stance on ISIS, and how does Jabhat Fath
al-Sham see itself as different from ISIS?
Our
stance on this group is very clear. We view them as deviant in their ideology
and criminal in their methodology. In Islamic jurisprudence there is a term
that we believe fits their description quite well, “Khawarij” [a
derogatory term for violent rejectionist groups in Islam]. From an
ideological standpoint, what classifies them as “khawarij” is their
excommunication of the Muslims according to their unorthodox, extreme
understanding of Islam and as well their twisted view of reality. This is their
basis to label all the different groups in Syria, including Jabhat Fath
al-Sham, as apostates. In their eyes, they are the only legitimate authority in
Syria and Iraq, and the only legitimate entity which all Muslims in the world
must pledge allegiance to.
From a
methodological perspective, they assume their governance through [coercion] and
military dominance. They consider it legitimate to fight everyone and
anyone that does not succumb to them, including Muslims, even those fighting
Assad. All of this is an expected outcome of their reprobate ideology. This
obviously makes them isolationists. They totally disregard all efforts of other
Muslims in the world and consider themselves to be the sole bearers of any
legitimate political Islamic authority. In their eyes, a world that they exist
in has no space for anyone else. I think my explanation above is sufficient to
outline the differences between us and them.
Fighters
from al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, fly Islamist flags in
Aleppo, Syria, as they head to a front line, May 26, 2015.
Photo:
Fadi al-Halabi/AFP/Getty Images
If Jabhat Fath al-Sham ultimately succeeded in defeating the
regime, what would be its intention for the future of Syria? How does
it see itself relating to the international and regional political order?
We do not
hope to defeat the regime alone. We are working toward this goal with the rest
of the groups on the ground. Jabhat Fath al-Sham’s hope is that a just
government will be established. It should include all of the sincere parties
who worked toward establishing it. We have never been hung up on governing. Our
aim is that the goals are met, irrespective of who will govern. The majority of
Syrians have been oppressed for the past 50 years. Restoring their rights and
relieving them from their pains can only happen if the Assad regime is
completely uprooted with all of its institutions. This project must see its
complete successful culmination in order for us to see the fruits. Anything
less would be cheating the people that entrusted us with this great
responsibility.
To the
second part of this question, I believe that nobody in the world is satisfied
with the amount of tyranny that exists today except the tyrants themselves,
their proxies and those benefiting from them. Syria is a perfect example of the
“international order” you speak of, watching on while millions of Muslims are
displaced or killed. We do not expect anything from them, nor do we wish for
their interference. However, their outrageous stance has clearly proven to the
world their corruption. We do not aim at Syria being a satellite state. That
would defeat the purpose of this Jihad.
The
proposed solution in Syria definitely sees the need for an Islamically
legitimate, practical solution to dealing with other political entities. We
understand that we do not live on this earth on our own. We have never had an
isolationist mentality in Syria, and we do not believe we can exist by
isolating ourselves from the world. However, we cannot propose any type of
solution in this field until we achieve full independence and stability. There
would obviously be a process that would include debate and discussion amongst
scholars and experienced professionals and specialists in every relevant field
before taking this step.
What
is Jabhat Fath al-Sham’s position on Syrian minorities (Alawis,
Druze, Shias, Christians)?
Islam’s
history is very clear about the need to provide security and civil rights to
minorities living in Islamic nations. It must be noted that this region had
large communities of minorities living peacefully under Islamic rule for
centuries. Abdel Qadir Al-Jaza’iri [a 19th-century Algerian political leader],
for example, protected the Christians of Damascus when they were attacked
unjustly in 1860. There are many similar instances in our history that we are
proud of.
However,
it would be unjust and irrational to talk about anything but the issue at hand.
That is: we are not fighting this war to target any minorities. We are
defending the majority Muslim Sunni population of Syria, who are being
slaughtered by a minority backed by an international coalition. Their rights,
which were ripped away from them by an Alawite minority, need to be restored.
The time to discuss the issue of the minorities is only after we achieve this
for them. To do this, uprooting the regime and all of its institutions entirely
is definitely a precondition. We see that we are heading in the right direction
toward our goal, and when we do get there, this question will obviously be
posed. The demographics of the country are changing dramatically, so it will be
very difficult to determine what Syria will look like by that time.
Even
though this matter is political, as Muslims we are not secular, we do not
adhere to the secular understanding of governance that the West does, and
therefore a decision on this matter cannot be made without a deep study of
Islamic jurisprudence. Rulings on such matters would have to be after the
establishment of all of our institutions, including a Ministry for Religious
Affairs and Rulings. This ministry would be made up of the qualified scholars,
that would be able to read into the complex, Islamic Sunni texts and provide an
Islamically legitimate proposed policy to deal with the issue. Having said
that, we believe that Islam is pragmatic in nature. By that, I mean that it is
capable of dealing with any situation and any era to find solutions for any all
problems we face.
When
Islam entered the Indian subcontinent and ruled for about 1,000 years, scholars
faced similar issues. They were, however, able to provide practical, Islamic
solutions to their reality, without the use of tyranny or oppression. If you
look at Islamic texts, you will find that it always provides a solution for
these problems. The main problem we face, however, is the interference of
foreign entities, often causing discord amongst the Muslims through backing one
sect against another and allowing them to fight on their behalf, from within
the society: a task that foreign invaders can never undertake on their own. The
solution to this issue is to stop interfering in affairs of the Muslims.
The White
Helmets, Syrian civil defense members, gather following airstrikes on the
rebel-held city of Idlib, controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra and its allies, on June
12, 2016. It was not clear who carried out the raids.
Photo:
Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images
Many have said that Jabhat Fath al-Sham seeks to ethnically
cleanse minorities from Aleppo. What is your response to this?
These
claims are absurd. We have shared in the administration of the freed areas of
Aleppo for many years now. We have been dealing with the Christian minorities,
and we have not faced these issues. Islam does provide a fair and balanced
solution for non-Muslim minorities to coexist in Muslim societies. It has been
general policy since the beginning of the efforts in Syria that we only focus
on those who take up arms against the population we are defending.
Why was
the Aleppo offensive campaign named after Ibrahim al-Yousuf [a former Syrian
army cadet who took part in a mass killing of Alawite cadets in 1979]? Is
Jabhat Fath al-Sham indicating that it will target Alawite citizens of
west Aleppo or elsewhere if it comes to power?
We must
put all of this in context. Ibrahim al-Yousuf was a captain in the Syrian army
who ignited an uprising that sought to rebel against the Alawite minority that
was ruthlessly oppressing a huge majority of Sunni Muslims since the Assad
family assumed power. It must be noted that immediately after assuming power,
the Assad regime created a majority-Alawite armed force and intelligence agency
that would later become the regime’s iron fist against the majority of Syrians.
Naming the battle after him was significant because it was in Aleppo, in that
very same Artillery College, that Ibrahim Al-Yousuf in 1979
ignited an uprising which continues to motivate people until today.
Ibrahim
al-Yousuf did not kill civilians. All of his targets were military officers.
Ibrahim al-Yousuf was killed as a result of his activism, but the Assad regime
did not stop there. In 1982, Rif’at Al-Assad (the brother of late president
Hafiz Al-Asad and uncle of Bashar Al-Assad) headed an offensive against the
city of Hama, where the uprising gained popular support and started to become
an organized movement. The offensive was referred to later as the Hama
massacre. Rif’at Al-Asad himself boasted of killing 38,000 residents of the
city. But Ibrahim al-Yousuf targeted military officers and not civilians. This
is extremely important in order to understand the reason why we named this
battle after him. Even though Bashar’s goal is the complete genocide, ethnic
cleansing, or subjugation of the Sunni population, our goal is as determined by
Islam: the removal of all oppression and the establishment of justice for all.
This is what the battle of Ibrahim al-Yousuf stands for.
Will
Jabhat Fath al-Sham and its allied factions seek to impose a siege now
over west Aleppo? If Jabhat Fath al-Sham takes Aleppo in its
entirety, what will be its intentions for the city?
We do not
aim to besiege civilians ever. If a siege will take place, it will be upon the
regime’s armed forces and militias that have come to aid them.
In
running the city, there would obviously be a very large
responsibility to administer the people’s affairs, bring about security, and
provide their basic needs in food, housing, water, electricity, and medical
care. Even though a lot of the burden would be on our shoulders, it would be a
joint effort with other sincere groups working with us.
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